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Introduction
Imagine you are the attorney for the New York Yankees.  Soon after the World Series, 
you get a call from the Boston Red Sox attorney demanding that you share your marketing 
profits for the past year.  You try to keep from laughing out loud, but kindly refuse to offer any 
amount of money to your archenemy.  The Sox attorney continues on stating that if you do not 
turn over a portion of your profits, he will sue the New York Yankees and George Steinbrenner 
for breach of fiduciary duty.  He claims that MLB Properties is a close corporation and as a 
league owner, and therefore shareholder of MLB Properties, your actions with respect to 
marketing violate your fiduciary duty to the league.  You politely decline again and hang up the 
phone.  Your next thought is: fiduciary what? In a close what?1
Now consider, that your buddy from college calls up and ask you to invest a small 
amount of money in his new corporation.  You help him out by buying 5% of the corporation.  A 
few years later you open up a business of your own.  A few days later after opening, your buddy 
class demanding that you will owe him your profits because you are an investor in his business.  
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1 See generally Timothy Watson, What’s Love Got to Do with It?: Potential Fiduciary Duties 
Among Professional Sports Team Owners, 9 Sports Law. J. 153 (2002).  Steinbrenner and the 
Yankees successfully settled with MLB Properties based on contract claims, however, Watson’s 
article shows that a fiduciary analysis may have defeated the venerable Steinbrenner.
2Again, fiduciary duties and close corporation shareholder is mentioned in the heated 
conversation. Your next thought is: fiduciary what? In a close what?
While the above situations are hypothetical, the issue of minority shareholders owing a 
duty to the majority in a close corporation is far from hypothetical.  It has been reality for at least 
20 years and still remains unsettled.  It is this reality that founders of businesses need to be aware 
of before making a choice of entity.  Two types of entities are generally available to a founder: 
partnerships and limited liability entities.  Choosing one entity over the other typically involves 
analyzing tax, administrative and liability issues.  Oversimplified, the choice is between greater 
administrative flexibility (partnerships), or limited liability (corporations).  However, what is 
almost never considered, or glossed over, is the impact of fiduciary duties on the owners of the 
business.  Fiduciary duties are a set of behavioral rules that owners agree to follow.  Generally, 
partners owe each other and the partnership these duties.  They agree to act with the highest 
regard to each other.  On the other side of the continuum are shareholders of a corporation.  
Except in limited circumstances, they do not owe anyone fiduciary duties.  For some the choice 
is easy, choose limited liability and one can act freely with one’s investment.
  Unfortunately, a special case exists within close corporations that demand discussion 
about fiduciary duties by corporate planners.  Courts have imposed partner-like fiduciary duties 
on corporation-like shareholders.  A partner who desires to limit liability in a partnership 
exchanges control for limited liability in the partnership.  Generally, any shareholder in a 
corporation need not worry about liability, but involvement in a close corporation morphs the 
relationship into one resembling an “incorporated partnership.”  Like a partner in a partnership, 
the minority shareholder in a close corporation must deal fairly with his fellow shareholders.  
3Unlike a shareholder in a corporation however, the minority shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to 
the majority.
The purpose of this paper is to warn close corporation participants, especially minority 
investors, of the special duties one incurs by being involved with a close corporation.  Part I 
outlines the primary concepts involved in choosing an entity.  Part II discusses the close 
corporation and the evolution of the minority shareholder fiduciary duty and two opposing views 
of the status of the fiduciary duty in the close corporation.  Part III proposes advice to persons 
forming businesses and investors in close corporations generally to deal with the potential 
consequences of these expanded fiduciary duties.
I.  Choice of Entity Decision
One of the early decisions founders face in starting a new business is the choice of entity.  
In today’s environment, numerous business forms are available to choose from: Partnerships, 
Limited Partnerships, S and C Corporations, LLC, LLP, LLLP are just some of these forms.  The 
decision is primarily based on liability limits, tax impacts, management, and financing that 
generally boil down to administrative ease vs. limited liability.  However, little attention is paid 
to considering fiduciary duties of the participants in the chosen entity.2  This section will briefly 
outline four primary factors in choosing an entity and discuss the differences between 
partnerships and corporations.3
A.  Liability Limits
2 E.g. Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations with Tax Planning (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
2003).  Notice the lack of discussion of general fiduciary duties.
3 Financing will not be discussed in this article.  The form and availability of financing may vary 
with the type of entity, however too many variations of the theme are available depending on the 
circumstances of the business owners and investors.
4The main difference between a partnership and corporation concerning liability is simple: 
unlimited liability vs. limited liability.  Partners in a general partnership are jointly and severally 
liable for the entity’s obligations.4  In other words, a partner’s liability can be unlimited.5  For 
example, if the partnership takes a loan from a creditor and defaults, each partner is separately 
liable for the whole debt.6  Similarly, if while conducting business a partnership employee or 
partner commits a tort, all partners can be personally liable for the consequences of the tort.7
This means one can sue the partnership and the partners individually and gain access to their 
partnership and individual assets.8  Furthermore, liability is not limited by the amount of a 
partner’s investment.9  So, a 10% minority partner will be liable for 100% of the partnership 
obligations.10
A corporation is a creature of statute.11  One or more shareholders that file incorporation 
papers with a particular state can form a corporation.12  Shareholders who form the corporation 
are not liable for the entity’s obligations, except in extremely limited circumstances.13  Nor are 
the shareholders personally liable for the actions of the corporation, its officers or its directors.14
So, a shareholder risks only the amount of investment placed with the corporation.15
B.  Tax Treatment
4
 Unif. Partn. Act § 306(a) (1997).
5
 There are exceptions.  See Unif. Partn. Act §§ 305-307.
6
 Unif. Partn. Act § 306, 307.
7
 Unif. Partn. Act § 305, 307.
8
 Unif. Partn. Act § 307.
9
 Limited partnerships and similar entities can be used to limit financial liability to the amount 
invested.  In that case general partnership rules and other attributes do not fully apply to the 
entity.
10
 Unif. Partn. Act § 306.
11
 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.01 (1994).  See e.g. 8 Del. Code Ann. § 101 (2003).
12
 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.01.
13
 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22.
14
 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22.
15
 Model Bus. Corp. Act  § 6.22(a).
5The main differences in tax treatment of these entities concerns income/loss distribution, 
timing, and complexity.  Partnerships are considered flow-through entities meaning income at 
the entity level is not taxed.16  Income and deductions are passed on to the individual partners.17
The partners include these items on their individual tax returns according to tax rules that apply 
to individuals.18  All income in the partnership is imputed to the partners regardless if it is 
actually distributed to them or not.19  This is an important concept for smaller businesses.  
Partners are not considered employees in the tax sense; they are partners.  Their income will not 
be limited to an arbitrary salary.  Rather the partner will be taxed on his distributive share.  
Additionally, partners do not have control over the timing of their income or losses.  All income 
or loss items must be reported (that is distributed) on a yearly basis whether cash is actually 
received by the partner or not.  So it is possible that in a partnership that generates $1 million in 
income, the partner will pay taxes based on the $1 million even though the partners agreed to 
give themselves $30,000 a year in “salary.”
The desirability of this form stems from the pass through of losses to the partners.20
Because depreciation or other expenses could create losses even when there may be a cash gain, 
the partners may be able to set off personal income and lower their personal marginal tax rates.21
However, a partner’s loss is limited by the amount of basis a partner has in his interest in the 
16
 I.R.C. § 701 (2003).
17
 I.R.C. § 704.
18
 Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations with Tax Planning § 2.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., 
Inc. 2003).
19
 I.R.C § 701-704.
20
 Cavitch, supra n. 18.
21
 Cavitch, supra n. 18.
6partnership.22  The larger and more complicated a partnership becomes, the more sophisticated 
and complex the tax planning can become.23
A corporation’s taxing system appears much simpler.  Corporations are taxed as separate 
entities.24  They declare income and take deductions in a manner similar to individuals.25
Shareholders generally receive their return on investment through dividends or sale of their 
stock.26  This income is again taxed creating the primary disadvantage of the corporate form: 
double taxation.27  A shareholder receiving dividends is usually taxed at higher ordinary income 
levels.  A corporation does not pass through its losses, so a shareholder cannot use the 
corporation to offset gain.  If the shares in the corporation decline in value or become worthless, 
the shareholder is able to takes appropriate losses upon sale or disposition of the shares.
The advantages of the corporate form directly offset the disadvantages of partnership 
taxation.  A corporation does not need to distribute income causing unwanted gains for 
shareholders.28  It has flexibility in timing its distributions.29  Net operating losses can be carried 
forward year to year to offset future income.30  And accounting for a shareholder’s investment in 
the firm is simple: a share is directly proportional to the firm’s total value.  An additional benefit 
for the small business is that owners can be paid corporate salaries that are considered deductible 
22
 I.R.C. § 704(d).
23
 More partners means accounting for more partnership interests and adjusted bases.  This task 
is relatively simple with three or four partners.  Consider a partnership with 50 or 100 partners 
with different ownership percentages.  Every partner’s interest and bases in partnership property 
needs to be accounted for and reported separate making the task Herculean.
24
 I.R.C. § 11(a).
25 E.g. I.R.C. § 162.
26
 Cavitch, supra n. 18, at § 2.04.
27
 I.R.C. §§ 11(b), 61(a).  Section 11 imposes the tax on coporate income, then section 61 
imposes the tax on a shareholder’s dividends.  Therefore, the income is “double-taxed.”
28
 Cavitch, supra n. 18.
29
 Cavitch, supra n. 18.
30
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7employee expenses.31  So, a small business corporation can pay out most of its income in salaries 
to the shareholder-employees and avoid double taxation.  The income is taxed only once; it is 
taxed only at the shareholder level as ordinary income.
C.  Management
Differences in management of the entities are theoretical more than practical as savvy 
planning and well-thought out contracts can easily make one entity manage like the other.  
Partners manage the partnership through the partnership agreement.32  The agreement may be 
formal or informal.33  Each partner is able to act for and bind the partnership, however, this may 
be varied by agreement.34  The default is that each partner is considered equal and has a right to 
equally manage the partnership.35  Each partner is assumed to have authority to bind the 
partnership except in specific circumstances that require written statements to be filed with 
authorities.36  Unmodified by agreement, issues are decided by majority vote of the partners 
regardless of the amount of capital contributed to the partnership.37  No formal meeting or other 
requirements are imposed upon a partnership’s management.  Lastly, any partner may dissolve 
the partnership by simply stating he no longer wishes to be a partner or through a partner’s death.  
Once this event happens, the partnership must wind up and dissolve.38
31
 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
32
 Unif. Partn. Act § 103.
33
 If no agreement exists, states usually provide default provisions similar to the Uniform 
Partnership Act.
34
 Unif. Partn. Act § 303.
35
 Unif. Partn. Act § 401(f).
36 E.g. Unif. Partn. Act § 303(e).
37
 Unif. Partn. Act § 401(f), (j).
38
 Unif. Partn. Act § 601.  These can be modified through agreement to provide for the 
continuing operation of the partnership is absence of a particular partner to temper the harshness 
of the default provision.
8Corporations are creatures of statute.  Owners must formally file incorporation papers 
with the state in order to be recognized.39  Minimal, but formal, requirements are imposed upon 
the operation of a corporation such as requirements to hold at least annual meetings, procedures 
for calling meeting, and electing of directors.40  Shareholders elect management by voting for 
directors according to a shareholder agreement made during incorporation.41  Unmodified by 
agreement, one share equals one vote.  Directors then choose officers to manage the corporation 
on a daily basis.42  Only officers and directors may act for or bind the corporation; shareholders 
have no power to act in the name of the corporation.43  A corporation’s existence is perpetual.  It 
is dissolved through shareholder action.  Unlike the partnership, one shareholder cannot alone 
dissolve the entity.
Techniques, as well as other entities, exist for planners and entrepreneurs to be able to 
choose the best of both worlds concerning liability, taxation and management.  Thus, it may 
appear that the choice of entity decision has little meaning as long as one can plan around the 
disadvantages through contract.  However, the concept of fiduciary duty rains on the planner’s 
parade.  A different set of fiduciary duties is imposed upon business participants depending on 
the entity chosen.  While these duties may not affect how the outside world deals with the entity, 
they have a major affect upon the interactions between the owners of the business.  This decision 
is rarely addressed between those starting a business and can have important implications in the 
operation of the business and the conduct of the participants including investors desiring 
39
 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.01, 2.02.
40
 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.05, 7.01.
41
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42
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9passivity.44  The next section discusses the importance of understanding this decision.  Choosing 
an entity is basically choosing the rules by which the owners wish to be governed.  Choosing the 
wrong set can have serious implications for owners and investors when things go awry.
D.  Fiduciary Duties
A fiduciary duty is the highest standard implied by law requiring one to act for the 
interests of another, while subordinating one’s own interests.45  Fiduciary relationships are found 
in many areas of law including attorney-client, executor-heir, and principal-agent relationships.46
Part of American law since its beginning, its definition to this day lacks precision.47  The concept 
originated with English courts of equity and from the law of trusts.48  Other relationships with 
trust-like attributes also were adjudicated under this concept that became known as fiduciary 
law.49  The two most fundamental fiduciary duties are: (1) the duty of care, and (2) the duty of 
loyalty.50  Derived from the law of agency, the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary (1) not to 
compete with the partnership; (2) not to profit from the relationship at the expense of the 
partnership or partners; (3) to refrain from adverse conduct; and (4) to not disclose confidential 
information.51
1.  Partnership fiduciary duty
44 E.g. Cavitch, supra n. 18. lacks a discussion about fiduciary duties.  The main focus is upon 
other factors listed above.
45
 Lawrence Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1675, 1683-1687 (1990); Black’s Law Dictionary 640 (Bryan A. Garner ed. 7th ed. West 1999).
46
 Mitchell, supra n. 45.
47
 Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary - Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your 
Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 479, 
482 (2000).
48
 Shaffer, supra n. 47.
49
 Shaffer, supra n. 47.
50
 Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business Associations, 26 
Del. J. Corp. L. 515, 519 (2001).
51
 Unif. Partn. Act § 404.
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Partners are fiduciaries to the partnership and each other.52  Of the above fiduciary duties, 
only the duty of loyalty and care are required of a partner.53  Case law development began with 
the landmark case Meinhard v. Salmon54 which imposed fiduciary duties on co-adventurers 
holding that “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior.”55  That standard of behavior is the “duty of the finest loyalty.”56
Meinhard involved two joint venturers who entered into an agreement to lease and manage a 
building.57  Near the end of the lease Salmon secured a lease from the owner for another new 
business opportunity.58  He kept the opportunity to himself and did not share it with Meinhard.59
Meinhard successfully sued Salmon stating that the fiduciary duty between partners required 
Salmon to share the opportunity with Meinhard and allow him the chance to compete.60
2.  Corporate fiduciary duty
Unlike the partners in a partnership, shareholders in a corporation do not owe a fiduciary 
duty to each other or to the corporation.61  Corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties 
to the corporation.62  In general these directors and officers do not owe a duty to the 
shareholders.63  However, through shareholder derivative suits, shareholders are able to protect 
52
 Unif. Partn. Act § 404.
53
 Unif. Partn. Act § 404(a).
54
 249 N.Y. 458 (1928).
55 Id. at 465.
56 Id. at 464-5.
57 Id. at 461.
58 Id. at 463.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 464-65.
61
 J. Mark Meinhardt,  Note: Investor Beware: Protection of Minority Stakeholder Interests in 
Closely Held Limited- Liability Business Organizations: Delaware Law and Its Adherents, 40 
Washburn L.J. 288, 295 (2001).
62
 Meinhardt, supra n. 61; See also Dalley, supra n. 50, at 526.
63
 Dalley, supra n. 50, at 526.
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their investments due to a breach of fiduciary duty.64  In some cases, controlling shareholders 
also owe fiduciary duties either to the minority shareholders, the corporation, or both.65  These 
duties are balanced by court developed doctrines such as the business judgment rule allowing 
directors and officers to escape liability by showing they honestly believed their actions were in 
the best interests of the corporation.66
A problem with the court application of fiduciary duties is that courts have written 
“opinions that, while correct, have generally failed to articulate the principles underlying their 
rulings and have relied instead on rhetoric, frequently with moral overtones.”67  This method of 
development of fiduciary law as applied separately to partnerships or corporation appears to be 
sufficient.68  However, as applied to close corporations, which exhibit attributes of both 
partnerships and corporation, fiduciary analysis breaks down.69  If choosing an entity means 
choosing the set of rules one wants to be governed under, the lack of underlying principles for 
fiduciary breaches has created a serious issue for the planner and owners desiring the close 
corporation business form.  The next section explores the development of fiduciary duties in the 
close corporation and explains how the minority shareholder, usually in a vulnerable position, 
has come to owe fiduciary duties to the majority.
II.  The Close Corporation
64
 Dalley, supra n. 50, at 526.
65
 Dalley, supra n. 50, at 555.
66
 Dalley, supra n. 50, at 520, n. 10.
67
 Dalley, supra n. 50, at 517.
68
 Dalley, supra n. 50, at 517.
69 See Mitchell, supra n. 45.
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Although the lion’s share of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, close 
corporations generally incorporate in the state they do business.70  Ninety percent of all 
corporations are close corporations.71  Of those corporations, few elect close corporation status.72
Close corporations are defined by statute in some states and loosely defined by common law in 
others.73  A close corporation is typically one where shareholders are few, the stock is not 
publicly traded, and the shareholders are most often the directors, officers, and employees of the 
corporation.74  Frequently, close corporation shareholders have invested significant percentages 
of their total wealth in the business and expect the investment to be a major source of income.75
As a result of all these factors, close corporation shareholders, especially minority shareholders, 
may seem trapped in their investment with little hope of exit.76
A close corporation is typically managed by all or most of the shareholders.77  That is, the 
shareholders are also the directors and officers of the company.78  A minority shareholder is 
dependent upon the majority to make fair and balanced decisions because the minority has no 
managerial control.79  Power to make decisions such as employment or dividend declarations can 
easily be abused by the majority.80  For example, the majority could fire a minority shareholder-
70
 Shannon Stevenson, Note: The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation 
Shareholder Duties, 51 Duke L.J. 1139, 1141, n. 15 (2001).
71
 Tara Wortman, Note: Unlocking Lock-in: Limited Liability Companies and the Key to 
Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1362 (1995).
72
 Wortman, supra n. 71, at 1362.  This percentage has not been updated or verified by the 
author.
73 E.g. 8 Del. Code Ann. § 342; Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 
Mass. 578 (1975). 
74 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 585.
75
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
76
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
77
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
78
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
79
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
80
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
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employee and refuse to declare dividends.81  Because close corporation shares are not readily 
available to the public, the minority is unable to easily dispose of his shares.82  Thus, the 
shareholder is trapped in a non-performing investment.83
A problem is created because participants in a close corporation generally do not seek 
comprehensive legal advice.84  Due to this fact, many close corporation shareholders are 
uninformed as to their rights and duties and do not seek to incorporate their expectations in 
contractual form.85   Most close corporation litigation revolves around majority shareholders, in 
their role as directors, officers or shareholders, exerting oppressive power over the minority.86
As a result, some states have enacted close corporation statutes altering some general corporation 
rules intended to, among other things, benefit the minority shareholder.87  However, most 
corporations who qualify for this status do not organize under these statutes.88  This is probably 
attributable to incorporator ignorance, attorney disfavor, or trusting pre-existing relationships 
between the shareholders.89
A.  Development of a Minority Shareholder’s Fiduciary Duty
1.  Fiduciary Duty for Majority Shareholders
Containing more morality than legality, Meinhard was the beginning of the road for 
imposing fiduciary duties on a minority shareholder.90  Some states adopt Delaware’s approach 
in refusing to attribute enhanced fiduciary duties to close corporation shareholders past that 
81
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
82 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
83
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1142.
84
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1143.
85
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1143.
86
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1147-1148.
87
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1147-1148.
88
 Wortman, supra n. 71, at 1362.
89
 Wortman, supra n. 71, at Part II.
90
 Mitchell, supra n. 45, at 1692.
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already imposed on public corporation shareholders.91  However, other states such as 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Illinois base their analysis on Meinhard and have adopted an 
enhanced fiduciary duty that all shareholders, majority and minority alike, owe each other 
fiduciary duties in a close corporation.92
In the corporate form, fiduciary duties are imposed between managers and the directors, 
directors and the shareholders, and majority and minority shareholders.  As stated above, the 
“content” of fiduciary duties for public corporations can be fuzzy.  However, courts view the 
close corporation shareholder as being in a different category as their public shareholder 
counterpart.  In doing so, they have created a new area of law that applies fuzzy standards from 
partnership law and corporation law to create an even fuzzier picture for a potential minority 
shareholder considering an investment in a close corporation.93
Close Corporation Stockholder Fiduciary Duty: Two Views
Whether shareholders in a close corporation owe each other fiduciary duties has two 
rather binary views: they do, or they do not.  Delaware, where a majority of corporations are 
incorporated, holds the minority view that closely held shareholders should not receive any 
special benefits.94  Massachusetts, and the majority of states, takes the view that those same 
shareholders should owe partner-like duties because of the intimate nature of the close 
corporation.95
The Minority View: Nixon v. Blackwell 96
91
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1147-1148.
92
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1147-1148; Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593.
93
 The terms ‘close’ and ‘closely-held’ appear interchangeable in the much of the law literature.
94 See infra, n. 100.
95 See infra, n. 109.
96
 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
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Delaware adopted the minority view of close corporation fiduciary duties when its 
highest court refused to uphold a trial court’s ruling that non-employee shareholders were 
entitled to relief when employees received stock in a close corporation on different terms than 
non-employees.97  Plaintiffs argued that by providing liquidity only for the employees through 
the ESOP plan while excluding the minority shareholders was a breach of the director’s fiduciary 
duties to the minority.98  The lower court agreed describing the plan as “inherently unfair.”99
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the ruling stating that Delaware corporation law does not 
require all stockholders to be treated equally.100  The court explained that before investing in a 
close corporation, minority shareholders have a variety of contractual provisions available to 
them to protect their interests in the corporation.101  Any special relief for minority shareholders 
in this instance would be inappropriate “judicial legislation.”102  Even though the corporation at 
issue was not a statutory close corporation, the court also stated that the result probably would 
not have been different.103  Coupled with Delaware’s longstanding “independent legal 
significance” doctrine, whether a statutory close corporation or not, a minority shareholder 
97 Id. at 1380-1381.  The corporation did not elect to be treated as a close corporation under 
Delaware statutes.
98 Id. at 1373.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1376.
101 Id. at 1379-1380.
102 Id. at 1381.
103 Id. at 1380, n. 19.  Delaware’s Close Corporation statute does not impose fiduciary duties 
between stockholders due to the election of close corporation status.  Most of the provisions 
allow a close corporation to forgo corporate formalities and gain more management flexibility 
that may resemble a partnership.  8 Del. Code Ann. §§ 342-356.
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cannot rely on enhanced fiduciary duties for protection.104  As a result, fiduciary duties will not 
be imposed on minority shareholders.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England105
Donahue represents the majority view of enhanced fiduciary duties in a close corporation 
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that stockholders in a close corporation 
owed each other partner-like fiduciary duties.106  A minority shareholder, Euphemia Donahue, 
sued the corporation, the directors, and the controlling shareholders for breach of a fiduciary 
duty.107  Rodd Electrotype was a close corporation with the majority of ownership owned by the 
Rodd family.108  When Harry Rodd, the most senior in the family, retired, the Rodd family 
enacted a plan that included the corporation repurchasing his shares at less than liquidating or 
book value.109  Donahue first learned of this action after it occurred and voted against a 
resolution that would have ratified the action.110  Donahue later offered her shares to the 
corporation but was denied.111
The court declared Rodd Electrotype a close corporation and held that all shareholders in 
a close corporation owe a fiduciary duty to each other.112  Ordinarily, a corporation may 
repurchase its stock without prejudice to stockholders, however, a close corporation’s controlling 
104
 The independent legal significance principle states that if one part of a transaction is legal 
under one provision of the Delaware code, it will not be subject to standards of another unrelated 
portion of the code.  Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1381.
105328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
106 Id. at 593.
107 Id. at 508.
108 Id. at 509.
109
 Alan H. Farnsworth, Close Corporations, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 986, 988 (1976).
110 Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 515.
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stockholders also “must have acted with the utmost faith and loyalty to other stockholders.”113
This stricter requirement was imposed because minority stockholders have little opportunity to 
protect themselves in these situations.114
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.115
Realizing this broad standard may cause trouble for majority shareholders acting as 
directors and officers in effectively running the business, the court later narrowed its holding in 
Wilkes by instituting a balancing test.116  Wilkes was a founding minority stockholder, treasurer 
and employee of a nursing home qualifying as a close corporation.117  The expectation of the 
founding shareholders was that each shareholder would receive compensation as long as each 
was active within the business.118  Each active shareholder/officer was guaranteed a 
directorship.119  Wilkes had been active in the management, and therefore elected as a director, 
for over fifteen years.120  During this time, Wilkes and the other directors drew a salary from the 
operational cash flow of the nursing home.121  Dividends were never declared.122  Year’s later, 
“bad blood” developed between Wilkes and the other shareholders.123  As a result, three of the 
four shareholders failed to re-elect Wilkes as a director or officer of the corporation that resulted 
in Wilkes also losing his salary.124
113 Id. at 518.
114 Id.
115
 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
116 Id. at 663.
117 Id. at 659-660.
118 Id. at 660.
119 Id. at 660, n. 7.
120 Id. at 660, n. 9.
121 Id. at 660.
122 Id. at 663, n. 13.
123 Id. at 660.
124 Id.
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The Wilkes court, concerned with “untempered application” of the Donahue standard, 
fashioned a balancing test that allowed the majority to manage the corporation when the actions 
taken were for legitimate business purposes.125  Once the majority demonstrates its actions were 
taken for a legitimate business purpose, the minority must demonstrate that the action could have 
been achieved in a practicably less harmful manner.126  Applying the standard to Wilkes, the 
court found that the failure to elect Wilkes as a director originated from the tense relationship 
between the shareholders and not any misconduct on Wilkes’ part.127  The court found that the 
majority’s action disregarded the founding policy of employment with participation and the 
knowledge no dividend had ever been declared which effectively lessened Wilkes return from 
the corporation to zero.128  In reality, the majority attempted a freeze out, a type of action that 
typically violates the majority’s fiduciary duty to the minority.
2.  Fiduciary Duty for Minority Shareholders
Much has been written about the majority’s duty to the minority in close corporations 
especially in the case of the majority oppressing the minority.129  Most case law and close 
corporation statutes are concerned with protecting the minority interest in a close corporation 
(rightfully so).  One may think that a minority shareholder has little or no duty to the corporation 
or the majority shareholders.  However, Donahue left open a small hole, through dicta, that 
imposes a fiduciary duty on the minority to the majority.130
125 Id. at 663.  Examples include setting dividend policy, mergers and acquisitions, setting 
corporate salaries, and hiring or firing of directors or corporate employees.
126 Id. at 663.
127 Id. at 664.
128 Id. at 664.
129 See e.g. F. Hodge O’Neal, O’Neals Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority 
Rights in Squeeze-Outs and Other Intracorporate Conflicts (2d ed. 1985).
130 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 515.
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In Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.131, a minority shareholder who wielded veto power 
over the majority was held to owe a fiduciary duty to the majority shareholders.  Four investors 
formed Atlantic Properties in order to manage a real estate concern.132  During incorporation, 
each investor agreed to insert a provision that required an 80% affirmative vote of the Board of 
Directors to effectively make any major decision regarding the corporation (“veto provision”).133
The corporation became profitable, retain a significant amount of its earnings, and later found 
itself in trouble with the IRS due to unreasonable accumulation of corporate profits.134  As in so 
many troubled cases involving close corporations, ill will developed between the shareholders.135
Due to the threat of IRS action, three shareholders wished Atlantic to declare dividends.136
However, Dr. Wolfson refused to vote to declare any dividend.137  As a result, the IRS fined 
Atlantic.138
Exploiting a footnote in the Donahue court’s dicta139, the Smith court agreed that majority 
shareholders can seek protection from a minority.140  Because the veto provision effectively 
131
 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
132 Id. at 799.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 800.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.  Dr. Wolfson claimed that refused to declare dividends because he wished the excess 
profits to be used for repair and improvement to Atlantic’s properties.  However, the trial court 
found that his refusal originated more in his dislike for his partners and personal tax avoidance 
than for any true maintenance program.  Id. at 800.
138 Id.
139
 In the tradition of full disclosure, this author disagrees with the outcome and application of 
fiduciary law to the facts of the Smith case.  However, this article is concerned with alerting 
minority shareholders to the duties they owe to other shareholders and the protections that may 
reasonably be asserted in light of these duties.  Discussing the merits of applying partnership-like 
fiduciary duties to investors who knowingly choose the corporate form of governance, which 
outside of close corporation generally do not apply strict fiduciary principles to minority 
shareholders, will be left for a later discussion.
140 Id. at 801.
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made any minority shareholder a “controlling group,” Donahue and Wilkes were applicable to 
the facts of the case.141  The court held Dr. Wolfson owed a fiduciary duty to the majority and 
violated it according to the Wilkes balancing test because his conduct went beyond reasonable in 
light of the warnings of penalties from the IRS.142
Although cases are few, the situations where the minority is found to owe a fiduciary 
duty are actions better described as torts than breach of fiduciary duty.143  An early case, Helms 
v. Duckworth, involved a 49% shareholder who negotiated a shareholder agreement requiring 
each stockholder to place his shares in a trust.144  Upon death of either shareholder, the deceased 
stock would be sold to the surviving member at the par value of $10 per share unless modified by 
a subsequent agreement.145  The trust agreement also provided that the majority could not vote 
for a dissolution or complete asset sale of the corporation without the minority’s consent.146  The 
majority shareholder Helms, who was 70 when the agreement was made, later died without ever 
having agreed to raise the value at which a surviving shareholder can buy the remaining stock.147
As a result, Duckworth was able to purchase Helms’ shares at $10 per share when the 
corporation’s current value was $80 per share.  The Appeals Court reversed the lower court’s 
summary judgment for Duckworth holding that he owed Helms a fiduciary duty “to deal fairly, 
honestly, and openly with . . . fellow stockholders . . . .”148  Finding that Duckworth never 
intended to increase the stock purchase price, the court held that his bargaining tactics 
141 Id. at 802.
142 Id. at 803.
143 E.g. Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995); Helms v. Duckworth, 249 
F.2d 482, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
144 Helms, 249 F.2d at 483.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 487.
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constituted a “flagrant breach of a fiduciary duty.”149  The court all but ignored any 
misrepresentation or fraud analysis, but rather put itself in the shoes of the deceased and assumed 
the agreement Helms made was not his intention.150
More confusion is created because states disagree whether minority shareholders who 
have been frozen out still owe a fiduciary duty to the majority.151  In both cases, the minority 
shareholder was “frozen out” by the majority.152  Yet, in one case the minority was allowed to 
open a competing business,153 and in the other, the minority violated a lingering fiduciary 
duty.154  The difference appeared to be in the minority’s conduct while being “frozen out.”  In J 
Bar H, the minority was wrongfully terminated and prevented from fulfilling her duties as a 
director.155  Frustrated, she began a competing business.156  The court held she did not violate her 
fiduciary duty even though she remained a director and shareholder.157  Treated as if she had 
resigned, the court held that a wrongfully terminated shareholder/director/employee is effectively 
stripped of any status that imposes a duty reasoning that “the fiduciary duty . . . depends on the 
ability to exercise the status which creates it.”158
149 Id.
150 Id. at 486.  Even though Duckworth admitted that it was his intent from the beginning never 
to increase the stock purchase price, Helms never requested a meeting in an attempt to change it.  
This is an early example of the distance courts will travel in order to find a fiduciary duty when 
they smell a bad deal regardless of the facts before them.
151 Compare Rexford, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995) with J Bar H, Inc. v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 849 
(Wyo. 1991).
152 Rexford, 58 F.3d at 1217; J Bar H, 822 P.2d at 853-854.
153 J Bar H, 822 P.2d at 861.
154 Rexford, 58 F.3d at 1221.
155 J Bar H, 822 P.2d at 853-854.
156 Id. at 854.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 861.
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The Seventh Circuit reached the opposite result explicitly refusing to accept the reasoning 
in J Bar H.159 Gregory was a long-time employee of Rexford Rand before being fired by the 
majority shareholder/directors.160  A few years later, the corporation failed to file its annual 
report with the state and as a result was administratively dissolved.161  This caused its trade 
names to become available.162  Discovering this fact, Gregory registered Rexford Rand’s trade 
names preventing the corporation from re-incorporating under it original name.163  The Appeals 
Court affirmed the lower court stating that the “freeze-out did not deprive Gregory of his status 
of shareholder” and therefore he “should have placed the interests of the corporation above his 
interests” and not appropriate the name in order to achieve the aim of a fair buyout of his stock 
by the majority.164
Other than demonstrating that a minority’s fiduciary duties are far from settled, Helms, J 
Bar H and Rexford reveal that a minority shareholder in a close corporation must walk softly.  
Whether a fiduciary duty is owed to the majority appears not to be the central issue.  Rather the 
courts appear to apply a clean hands or tort-like analysis to the minority’s actions and declare a 
fiduciary duty if they do not like what they see.165  Both minority shareholders in J Bar H and 
Rexford held shares in their respective corporations at the time of the alleged duty breaching 
actions.166  Each action the minority took, analyzed in a vacuum, is arguably a breach of 
fiduciary duties.  Applying partnership law suggests that these actions are breaches of fiduciary 
159 Rexford, 58 F.3d at 1220.
160 Id. at 1217.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1220.
165 E.g. id. (“The method by which [Gregory] sought to induce a settlement, however, is 
troubling.”).
166 Rexford, 58 F.3d at 1217; J Bar H, 822 P.2d at 855.
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duties.  Applying corporation law suggests the opposite.  In either instance, it is important that 
the planner include a discussion about fiduciary duties, not just limited liability or tax 
consequences, in order for any shareholder to fully understand their responsibilities. 
B.  Implications for the Minority Shareholder
Typically, the disadvantages to being a minority shareholder can be contracted around.167
For example, venture capital firms taking a minority position develop shareholder agreements 
that preserve the power to control the corporation and keep their investment liquid.168  Provisions 
allow the firm to veto board decisions, control officer compensation, and require the majority 
shareholders or the corporation to buy-out its shares.169  Also, electing close corporation status 
provides additional protections for minority shareholders (e.g. dissolution requirements) not 
available to public corporation minority shareholders.170
However, most statutes fail to further define fiduciary duties leaving interpretation to the 
common law.171  The common law’s “progress has been uncertain and incomplete” leaving the 
hole opened by Donahue and Smith as to when a minority investor may be violating his fiduciary 
duty to the majority.172  In other words, how does one know when protecting one’s minority 
investment crosses the fiduciary line?
As revealed by Smith , using veto power to overrule the majority causes the minority calls 
into question the minority’s fiduciary duty.  Arguably, the conduct of the minority doctor was 
egregious, but this only substitutes one problem for another.  If only egregious conduct violates a 
167
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1145.
168
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1154.
169
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1155-1164.
170
 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751 (2001).
171
 One exception is Minnesota’s statute which defines enhanced fiduciary duties.  Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 302A.751(1)(a)(2) (2001).
172
 Stevenson, supra n. 70, at 1175 (internal quotations omitted).
24
minority’s duty to the majority, what is egregious conduct?  This refocuses the inquiry on one’s 
conduct and forgets to answer the question whether a fiduciary duty should be imposed in the 
first place.  Focusing on minority shareholder conduct does not solve the problem either.  J Bar 
H and Rexford minority shareholders both took action in order to preserve their investment.  
Both types of actions have been declared breaches of fiduciary duty in the past: opening a 
competing business and appropriating corporate property for one’s own benefit.  However, 
another imperceptible line was drawn describing one action as a breach and the other not a 
breach.  Again, the discussion did not answer the question whether the minority should have 
owed a duty to the majority in the first place.
So, if not in a state that has adopted Delaware’s philosophy, a minority shareholder must 
realize that courts may analyze a minority shareholder’s assertion of power on the same level as 
a majority’s action.  The minority must also realize that he cannot frustrate the legitimate 
business actions of the majority regardless of the power given up to him under contractual 
agreements.  According to Donahue and its progeny, any minority shareholder in a close 
corporation may find itself violating fiduciary duties regardless of the size of its ownership.  
From the case law above, a minority shareholder that attempts to use his power negotiated from 
the majority to frustrate legitimate business goals will probably violate fiduciary duties to the 
majority.  However, it is unclear whether a minority with insignificant holdings in the close 
corporation will be liable for other fiduciary duties.
III.  Recommendations for the Planner
Investing in a close corporation is risky especially if a particular investor is in the 
minority.  Obviously understanding one’s rights when investing or founding a corporation makes 
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for better legal and business decisions.  Including discussion about fiduciary duties will give the 
investor the complete picture about his investment.  The following are simple recommendations 
for making sure this issue will not come back to haunt the uninformed.
A.  Be aware of both statutory and common law governing close corporations in your 
jurisdiction.  Delaware does not recognize close corporation fiduciary duties among shareholders 
in common law or statutorily.  Massachusetts has a judicially created doctrine and Minnesota has 
codified enhanced fiduciary duties.  The primary reason for these doctrines as applied to close 
corporations is to protect shareholders and release administrative burden.  However, as discussed 
above, application to the close corporation is inconsistent.  At its best, courts will prevent truly 
egregious behavior on the part of a shareholder or group of shareholders.  At its worst, a result 
may be imposed that was never contracted for when the founders dreamed up their business.
B.  Lawyers advising multi-owner founders need to add fiduciary duties to the discussion.  
While these duties may not affect the tax treatment or liability of the entity, it may affect the 
manner in which an owner wishes to manage his investment.  The advantage of these duties is 
that all shareholders are accountable to each other; the transaction cost of managing one’s 
investment is low.  Loyalty and careful management is expected.  The disadvantage, however, is 
that these duties may restrict the behavior of all the shareholders equally regardless of the size of 
their investment.  For example, a minority investor may not be able to invest in other businesses 
if they are remotely related to the close corporation.  Additionally, “compliance” with fiduciary 
duties may increase the cost of managing the corporation.  Justification of riskier business 
decisions may mean initiating more discovery than would be required if fiduciary duties were 
waived.  So, it is possible the disadvantages may outweigh the advantages.
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C.  Disclose the owners’ intentions with respect to fiduciary duties in the incorporation or 
shareholder agreement.  State simply whether the owners want fiduciary duties, including which 
ones, or not.  Unless the breaching behavior becomes especially egregious, the courts appear to 
follow the intention of the parties to these contracts.  It is possible that some portion of the duties 
cannot be waived, however if the choice of entity is seen as choosing the set of rules one wishes 
to be governed under, at least the “breaching party” can point to the original intention of the 
parties.
IV.  Conclusion
Investing is a risky business.  Investing is a close corporation is riskier.  Being a minority 
investor in a close corporation keeps you up at night.  To manage this risk, a number of 
contractual and statutory provisions have been used to level the playing field.  While the 
minority investor gets some relief, this power equalization creates another problem:  fiduciary 
duties being imposed on the minority for unduly exercising its power gained from negotiating 
with the majority.  This paper has attempted to inform a minority stockholder where these duties 
came from and where they could be applied.  Hopefully armed with this information, minority 
shareholders can negotiate and craft contractual provisions that still protect their investment, but 
do not place themselves in a position of being sued for simply exercising their rights.
